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FOOD AID PROBLEMATICS
The Case of Northern and Upper Ghana
On a cloth untrue
With a twisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
Introduction
The Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana are the poorest regions, the ones 
facing the most intractable climatic and research problems and the ones with 
the highest levels of malnutrition. At the peak of the 1981 —83 drought they 
showed the sharpest fall in output (which by 1985 did not appear to have been 
made good unlike other regions and Ghana as a whole). Even in normal years 
malnutrition is endemic year round and particularly high in the hungry season 
before the harvest.
A classic case for food aid? Perhaps albeit except during the drought these 
regions have not - directly or indirectly - been the major recipients of food 
aid. An area in which emergency food aid was a success - after all famine was 
averted in 1983? Yes, but in the absence of war or massive waves of war 
refugees drought has not led to famine (defined as massive deaths directly 
related to malnutrition) anywhere in Africa. An example of the wisdom of 
physically getting relief food to hungry people or areas? Perhaps, but even 
in 1983 food aid lorries going north regularly passed lorries carrying 
commercial food flows south. An example of the difficulty of tackling medium 
term developmental issues with food aid and relating them to immediate 
survival neeeds during a crisis? Yes.
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The Food Balance
In a normal or good harvest year the Northern and Upper Regions are major 
exporters of grain (rice, millet, guinea-corn) root crops (yams), vegetable 
oilseeds (groundnuts, sheanuts) and livestock to Forest and Southern Ghana as 
well as to Burkina, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. Except for rice - which is grown 
in highly mechanised, irrigated large farmer enclaves - and yams - in which 
case a large farmer sub-sector exists - the sales are largely by small peasant
farming households. On the face of it the commercial food flow balance
suggests that these are food surplus regions. And so at that level they are.
But the impression these flows might give of well fed farming families is
untrue. The malnutrition and infant mortality levels are the highest in
Ghana. There is a pronounced hungry season before harvest when many
households have nearly run out of food.
For the urban poor (in Tamale and the smaller towns) the paradox is a simple 
one of entitlements less than needs. Many households do not have the means to 
buy enough food to meet nutritional needs so these do not result in effective 
demand. Similarly their incomes do not rise during the hungry season but the 
cost of food does. For the rural poor the situation appears more complex - 
households with enough food production to meet dietary needs sell food even 
though this puts them below the malnutrition line. But this too is an 
entitlement problem. Ghanaian peasant farmers are not in a "subsistence” 
sector or economy. They buy goods (cloth, pots and pans, sugar, hoes,
matchets) and services (school fees, medical fees, local transport) which are 
also necessities. Because waged labour opportunities (formal or informal) are 
limited and non-food crop production even more so there is little option for 
most but to sell food crops.
This pattern has four implications:
a. in normal years physical food availability in the geographic area is not 
the bottom line problem;
b. shipping food in is likely to alter dietary patterns (millet, guinea corn 
and yams are unusual food aid components);
I
- 3 -
f
c. if the food aid is sold it will not deal with the malnutrition problem - 
especially during the hungry season - if nothing is done to augment poor 
household incomes and thus entitlements/effective demand;
d. imported food aid given to poor households would improve the dietary 
position but would - ironically - lead to more cross shipments of food 
into and out of the regions.
In severe drought years the situation is rather different. There is an 
absolute shortage, Ghana’s early 1980s figures - even if of doubtful accuracy 
- of under 70% of necessary calories being available on average even 
nationally do tell something about the food situation, especially in these
three regions where availability was substantially less than the national 
average. But the problem is still basically an entitlement one and
substantial cross flows of imported food aid up and commercial domestic food
flows down still continue. The pattern is one of empty backhauls and full
lorries passing each other going in opposite directions. Since the purpose of 
food aid is presumably not to maximise road haulage business (and petroleum 
product use), this cross haul situation cannot be viewed as even second best. 
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the three main external food 
aid commodities - rice, wheat, maize - do not figure prominently in lower 
income diets in these three regions. (They do in Forest and Coastal Ghana, 
especially among formal sector wage employees.)
Emergency Needs
In a bad drought year physical food aid flows to the regions are needed. But 
these will not help poor households unless they are given access to additional 
income earning possibilities and/or food aid is delivered free or 
(particularly in urban areas) at subsidised prices. Those are the only two 
ways of tackling the entitlements gap.
At these periods food aid injections will indeed cause lower prices - and so 
they should. Drought period peak prices (even assuming the share of farmers 
as a whole in the ’above normal' element is substantial which is not always 
the case) will not benefit the hardest hit farming households who have little 
or no food beyond survival levels and therefore sell very little. Further,
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they clearly injure the non-farming poor (perhaps a quarter of the total in 
these regions) because higher food prices simply erode their entitlements. 
Nor are skyhigh prices long after the crop is planted (or, a fortiori, 
harvested) efficient incentives.
But even in sub-normal (and, probably, bad drought) years a substantial 
proportion of the food aid needs could be met by local purchases (local to the 
regions that is). This would both limit forced alterations in diet and reduce 
transport costs substantially. It would, however, also reduce the flow of 
Northern and Upper Region food to the Coastal and Forest zones. Assuming that 
food is replaced by food aid that too reduces costs and the strain on a weak 
road system, an overstretched lorry fleet and the fuel burdened balance of 
payments.
The optimal use of food aid in such a year would appear to be:
a. limited shipments of imported white maize and sugar to the Northern and 
Upper Regions;
b. substantial purchases of millet, guinea corn, yams, groundnuts and - 
perhaps - some rice in the regions for free (or food for work)
distribution in the regions;
c. food aid for free distribution in the form of imported white maize and 
sugar in the rest of the country combined with locally purchased red palm 
oil;
d. with food aid wheat and rice sold in the Forest and Coastal zones 
(especially in the towns) to finance the local purchases.
This pattern would reduce transport costs and limit warping of food patterns.
In a drought year the main stress will probably need to be on free
distribution although work for food programmes (see below) once established
could be expanded in drought years.
The pattern sketched here is likely to apply generally in 2 or 3 years in 10, 
but on the past drought cycle record these may well be consecutive not 
scattered years. In other years pockets of crop failure frequently do exist
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but in these cases swap or internal monetisation selling wheat/rice and
purchasing the actual distributed food in nearby districts with normal 
harvests should be practicable.
Entitlement Raising
In a normal year food aid is still needed in the sense that poor households in 
these regions need more food. However, as noted this is an entitlement
problem and may very well co-exist with national physical surpluses (in 
effective demand terms) as in white maize in 19 88. Since Ghana has a
* I
permanent deficit in wheat and a substantial one not likely to disappear soon 
in rice, internal monetisation to allow local purchase of distributed, food 
for work and work for food programmes would normally be practicable.
Entitlement raising can use several instruments:
a. selective, e.g. school and clinic feeding programmes;
b. increasing work opportunities in economically valuable public works 
projects by financing the labour cost with food;
c. supplementing wages with food rations;
d. empowering poor peasant households to produce more;
e. strengthening directly productive and social sectors to enable them to
pay a living wage;
f. creating fair price shops in areas (e.g. mining and logging towns and 
perhaps one or two Northern and Upper Region trading towns) characterised 
by tight oligopsony at wholesale level evidenced by disproportionately 
high food prices rising whenever local employer wages do whatever the 
general food market balance;
g. food subsidies or free distribution whether general or targetted.
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The first approach is used with real but limited positive effects. The second 
is now to be included in PAMSCD (Programme to Mitigate the Social Costs of 
Adjustment) albeit there appears to be a relatively low proportion of this 
programme in the three regions considered here. In general this is a way 
likely to be best programmed by selling wheat and rice on the Coast,
tranporting money and either buying local staple foods for distribution to
employees or paying them the cash and allowing them to buy their own 
additional food.
The third approach has been used quite successfully by WFP but in the export 
and export transport sectors (gold mining, timber, ports, railways, highways). 
As a supplement to capital rehabilitation to cover paying efficiency wages 
while productivity recovers it has clear merits albeit if large (100J of cash 
wage for many low wage earners in the Ghana case) it poses inevitable intra 
enterprise distortions and major phase-out problems. It is in a sense one 
form of "e" - sectoral/enterprise strengthening albeit that could be done 
without food aid or using monetised food aid’s counterpart for capital or 
selected operating costs.
Northern and Upper Ghana agricultural productivity is to a large extent 
intractable. Some micro or local breakthroughs have been made - e.g. Global 
2000 in the Upper West - but in general actual food productivity raising (per 
hectare or per hour) and new seed/technique research has not fared well. 
(Given the better apparent results in Botswana, Zimbabwe and some other
Southern African cases more exchange of information with SACCAR, the South
African Development Coordination Conference’s agricultural clearing house 
might prove useful.) However, there are some options known to be practicable:
a. better health service access and preventative medicine to reduce time 
lost to enduring and caring for illness;
b. greater access to nearby pure water on a continuing basis (i.e. including 
maintenance) both to save time now spent carrying water and to reduce 
incidence of water born diseases;
c. food processing and preparation innovations which save time or reduce 
losses;
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d. better supply of basic hand tools (machets, hoes, shovels, pickaxes);
e. selective extension of animal drawn implement use;
f. rehabilitation and development (where feasible) of pond and seasonal 
stream flow based irrigation (and perhaps animal powered archimedean 
screw type irrigation from larger rivers and Lake Volta - especially to 
create an economically viable, labour intensive, small scale rice 
industry.
The labour saving point is relevant because at peak seasons labour is a 
constraint. Thus the quite high day wages for agricultural workers for from 
30 to 90 days (in these regions) and their relative scarcity. 30 to 90 days 
work will not draw back townspeople nor - at peak agricultural work time - can 
a poor/peasant household utilise it without risking its own crops (except in 
the more densely populated, land scarce districts in the Upper East region).
Food aid can be used to support these programmes. But it can be so used only 
if:
a. it is used whether directly (rations) or indirectly (proceeds of sales) 
to meet labour costs; and/or
b. is used after monetisation to meet local costs more generally; and
c. is complemented by foreign exchange or relevant commodity imports (e.g. 
steel to make implements, drugs for clinics, paper for books and pads for
schools) whose sale could also generate counterpart funds toward local
costs.
Fair price shops are not extant in Ghana. They may be introduced by one or 
more large employers. In the Northern and Upper Regions they would probably 
need to be run by cooperatives (perhaps operated by poor women both to hold 
prices down and to earn supplemental incomes). However, it is not clear that 
in these regions oligopsony of the type noted is widespread. Further there 
are problems of getting assured stable supplies to sell (unless food aid
internal swap purchases can be used to buy at harvest and wholesale to the
shops) and a very evident lack of any present organisational base on which to 
build.
Apart from famine averting relief, general free food distribution is limited 
in Ghana. Food stamps would on the face of it appear likely to be 
impracticable whether as a subsidy or a free ration mechanism.
Seasonality
None of the food aid programming appears to face the hungry season challenge 
head on. There is a need to inject entitlements disproportionately during the 
pre-harvest season when they are otherwise lowest for poor families.
To a limited extent this is done in some clinic and other ngo food
distribution/diet supplementation programmes. But where it is most needed is 
in supplementary employment. At least much of the hungry season has good 
(i.e. dry) weather for public works and limited crop tending demands. This 
counter seasonality could - and should - be built into labour intensive public 
works programmes.
A rather different seasonality problem exists in relation to commercialised 
food aid arrival and sale patterns. This relates primarily to rice (a 
Northern and Upper East regional crop albeit largely an enclave one) since no 
wheat and little sugar are produced and maize imports are in response to
severely below normal crops. About half of Ghana’s rice consumption is
produced locally. Given limited storage, imports of food aid rice during and 
just after harvest result in greater seasonal price swings for rice and lower 
prices for the domestic crop. These problems could be reduced by scheduling 0 
rice aid arrivals for the harvest quarter, one-eighth of the year's imports in 
the next, one-quarter in the third and three-eighths in the pre-harvest
quarter. This would reduce counterpart fund proceeds but directly to the 
advantage of growers and - during the pre-harvest quarter - consumers.
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From Emergency To Development
The seasonality and entitlement potentials of food aid in Northern and Upper 
Ghana as sketched above are largely developmental. The emergency aspect is 
just that - emergency coping, starvation averting.
This leaves an undistributed middle-rehabilitation. It has been noted above 
that recovery in Northern and Upper Ghana after 1983 appears to have lagged 
that in Ghana as a whole. Weather does not appear to be the cause.
One factor is fairly clearly that many poor households had had their 
productive capacity gravely eroded during the three year drought. For 
example:
a. seed stocks had been run down and with cash reserves gone buying was not 
a practicable alternative;
b. hand tools had suffered a similar fate;
c. as had livestock herds (cattle, goats, poultry);
d. in addition there had been deterioration of certain productive 
infrastructure, e.g. natural and artificial ponds used to water livestock 
in the dry months and for limited irrigation during the rains. Albeit 
this began well before 1980 it was by 1984 - and is as of 1989 - a major 
rehabilitation problem.
To these can be added "deferred maintenance" on houses (which becomes urgent 
to make good after 2 to 4 years) and the need to rebuild exhausted household 
inter year grain reserves.
These are rehabilitation of household livelihood and welfare capacity needs 
not developmental programmes in the normal sense. But nor are they emergency 
needs as normally defined. Emergency programmes do not in many cases include 
them at all and when they do these are usually gross underfunded heads 
compared to emergency food for distribution.
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Logically during every emergency programme (not only in Northern and Upper 
Ghana) the parameters of need for rehabilitation support should be outlined, 
means to meeting them identified and resources mobilised. Whether food aid - 
as opposed to its counterpart funds - could make a large contribution is 
unclear and probably varies from case to case. In these regions 1984-87 
supplementary employment clearly would have been directly relevant as would 
tool provision financed in part by the sale of wheat (and provision of steel 
commodity aid). The clear lesson is that the dichotomy now existing in 
virtually all aid agencies (including but not limited to food aid) between 
emergency and development is counterproductive and tends to allow 
rehabilitation to fall between two stools with anything but a soft landing for 
the people affected.
Women, Food and Nutrition
Northern and Upper Ghana are characterised by gender divisions of labour (and 
of workloads) and of budgetary responsibilities. Programmes overlooking those 
realities are likely to have unexpected (and usually unfortunately so) results 
or non-results.
Agricultural tasks are largely gender divided (admittedly rarely 100$ one 
gender) as well as product divided. Cattle herding tends to be male as do 
large scale agriculture and non-food crops; production of food crops for the 
household is predominently female after land clearing.
Similarly, wooding, watering, food processing and tending the sick are 
predominently (in some areas virtually exclusively) female. Therefore time 
saved by provision of better services or techniques in respect of these tasks 
will reduce women’s workloads (which tend to be much greater than men’s) and 
free time for directly productive activity at the key agricultural seasons 
when the labour constraint is binding.
To recognise the existence of a gender division of labour (not as it happens a 
traditional one in some respects) is important but needs to be separated from 
necessarily endorsing it. For example, day labour is largely male. It 
would, however, be desirable to take positive steps to ensure that a 
significant proportion of supplementary, and especially seasonal, employment
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was female. Animal use is basically male but female headed households should 
be included in programmes to extend use of animal power. But equally because 
water gathering is a female task, women should be taught improved source
maintenance and management skills and be involved in project planning and
design.
The employment point relates to budget structures. Northern and Upper
Ghanaian households rarely have single pooled budgets. Women usually keep
earnings from food processing and selling, small scale food selling, and
related 'female activities' and when they do have wage incomes normally keep
these as well. From these and their own food production plus - sometimes - a
contribution from the adult male household member, it is the woman's
responsibility to feed the household. Food rations given to a man in kind are
usually passed on to his wife which explains their remarkably positive
household amity impact in the WFP food ration programme..
Thus what income streams are augmented, who earns them and whether food for
work or work for (cash to buy) food is practised can affect how much the
nutritional status of poor households is improved by food aid (and policy 
interventions more generally).
Envoi
This review of problematics and as yet unrealised potentials is not a
condemnation of food aid in general or to Northern and Upper Ghana in 
particular. In the latter case it did avert starvation in 1983/84, has
assisted some aspects of recovery and is being used somewhat more creatively
in PAMSCAD.
Rather it suggests that more programming attention is needed to local 
procurement (vs 'Food Fetishist' demands all imported food aid literally be 
handed to the ultimate poor beneficiaries), to selective monetisation, to 
creative utilisation in support of developments that will assist poor 
households and empower them to earn/produce more and to relating emergency and 
developmental food aid through a household (or broader in the case of 
debilitated regions) rehabilitation phase. The challenge is not that food aid 
is in any general sense failing, but that the efficiency of its use for
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development and especially development both by and serving poor households can 
and should be increased substantially and speedily.
Falmer 
January 1989
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